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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
Most stakeholder-based  research  concerning  agri-environmental  schemes (AES) derives from  work
engaging  with  farmers  and land managers.  Consequently,  the  voices  and opinions  of other  actors  involved
in  AES tends  to be  unrepresented  in the  wider literature. One group of actors  that  seem  particularly  over-
looked  in this  respect  are private (independent)  farm  advisors  (i.e.,  the  consultants  contracted  by  farmers
and land managers  to advise-on AES and agronomic  matters).  To  begin to rectify this knowledge  gap  we
developed  an exploratory  online  survey to explore  private farm  advisor  perspectives  in the  UK;  specifi-
cally,  the  situation  in England  and  advisors’  experience of Natural  England’s  Environmental Stewardship
programme.  A  total  of 251 Natural England  registered  farm  advisors  (29.9%)  completed  our survey.  The
majority  of these had  knowledge  and  expertise  in relation  to  two  (31.5%)  or  three (42.2%) Environmental
Stewardship  schemes, with  proficiency in ELS (93.4%) and  HLS (82.8%) being  the  most  common.  On aver-
age,  advisors  had 9.6  ± 5.6  yrs  of experience and  operated  (75.3%)  in a single  region  of England.  Although
our results concentrated  upon a relatively  simple set of initial topics of inquiry, the  survey revealed  a
number  of interesting  findings.  Firstly;  for  example, that  in  the  opinion of the  advisors  working with  farm-
ers applying  for Environmental  Stewardship  schemes, the  ’knowledge-exchange  encounter’  occurring
between  themselves,  their clients and Natural England  is  fundamental  to the  environmental  effective-
ness  of these schemes as well  as  their  farm  business compatibility.  Secondly,  respondents  suggested  that
beneath this ‘encounter’  lie  tensions  arising from the  competing agendas  and  objectives of  the  different
actors  involved  which  can affect the  content of agreements;  for  instance,  farmer selection of management
options versus  Natural  England’s target  environmental  objectives.  Farm advisors  suggested  that  they  had
to  negotiate  this  balance  whilst also  serving the  needs  of their  clients. Thirdly,  respondents  raised  issues
concerning  the complicated nature  of scheme  arrangements,  both from  their  own and  farmers’  per-
spectives,  as well  as  the  adequacy  of payments  to cover input  costs and matters  regarding contractual
compliance,  all  of which  theyproposed affected farmer  participation.  Looking  ahead, we believe  that
future AES should account  for  all of these  issues  in their  design  to aid long-term farmer  participation,
effective  agreement  implementation  and  beneficial  environmental  management.
©  2016 The  Authors.  Published by Elsevier Ltd.  This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Driven by a range of complex local and global drivers (e.g.,
globalisation, food security concerns) food production and domes-
tic consumption patterns have undergone rapid transformations
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(e.g., FAO, 2003; OECD/FAO, 2011; Tscharntke et al., 2012; Poppy
et al., 2014). These changes have been accompanied by significant
agricultural intensification and extensification (FAO, 2012, 2014;
Godfray and Garnett, 2014). Striking a  balance between intensifi-
cation and extensification is a  central challenge for modern food
production systems (Pretty et al., 2010; Balmford et al., 2012;
Grau et al., 2013).  Without balance, environmental risks are high
and may  include deforestation and forest degradation, loss of  bio-
diversity, soil  erosion, decreased water quality, water shortages,
increases in  greenhouse gas emissions and changes in  biogeochem-
ical cycles (e.g., Gibbs et al., 2010; Quinton et al., 2010; Lambin
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.04.005
0264-8377/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the  CC  BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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and Meyfroidt, 2011; Lenzen et al., 2012; Mills Busa, 2013; WWAP,
2014).
In Europe aspects of the agricultural sector have also undergone
a degree of intensification (OECD, 2008), with concomitant reper-
cussions for ecosystems, biodiversity and water resources (e.g.,
Tscharntke et al., 2005; Billeter et al., 2008; Henle et al., 2008;
EEA, 2010; Pe’er et al., 2014; Zanten et al., 2014). The continu-
ing problem European Union (EU) Member States face is  trying to
maintain thriving and competitive agricultural and forestry sectors
whilst also ensuring a  secure provision of environmental public
goods (Allen and Hart, 2013). In response, to resolve this tension,
incentive-based management strategies such as agri-environment
schemes (AES) have been introduced throughout the EU (Deal et al.,
2012; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Lefebrve et al., 2015).
Initially optional, the 1992 MacSharry Reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) made AES a  compulsory agricultural mea-
sure for all EU Member States; with further consolidation via
the Agenda 2000 Reform leading to their provision under Pillar
2 of the CAP (European Commission, 2005; McCormack, 2012).
Essentially, AES operate through voluntary contractual agreements
and provide farmers with payments in return for the delivery
of environmental public goods and services and/or the adoption
of modern environmentally-friendly farming practices (Garrod,
2009; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Lefebrve et al., 2015). Their imple-
mentation is based on the subsidiarity principle, meaning that
AES are specially designed to negotiate the particular production-
conservation circumstances faced by  individual Member States,
which they achieve by addressing three intertwined matters,
namely: greening farming practices; reducing food production
impacts on biodiversity and improving overall countryside man-
agement (European Commission, 2005; Smits et al., 2008; European
Court of Auditors, 2011; McCormack, 2012; Allen and Hart, 2013;
Burton and Schwarz, 2013).
Following their introduction in the UK in  1986 various versions
of AES have affected more than 6 million Ha of agricultural land
in England alone (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008; Gibbs, 2010; Tucker,
2010). The most significant recent variant, ‘Environmental Stew-
ardship’, began in 2005 (Chaplin and Radley, 2010). Its purpose—to
offer a fresher, more radical, two-tiered approach to  land man-
agement characterised as ‘broad and shallow’ and ‘narrow and
deep’ (Hart, 2010). The ‘broad and shallow’ tier was designed
as a non-competitive and open-access arrangement, while the
‘narrow and deep’ component was configured as a targeted and
competitive option for meeting priority environmental objectives
(Boatman et al., 2010). In  England, the Entry Level Stewardship
(ELS) scheme represents the ‘broad and shallow’ approach, which
also includes organic (OELS) and upland (UELS) variants, while
Higher Level Stewardship (HLS) represents the ‘narrow and deep’
element (Boatman et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2010; Supporting infor-
mation Table S1).
So, how effective are AES schemes at meeting their stated envi-
ronmental goals? At  both the European (e.g., Kleijn and Sutherland,
2003; Kleijn et al., 2011) and UK (e.g., Whittingham, 2007; Boatman
et al., 2008; Defra and Natural England, 2008; Whittingham, 2011)
scale evidence suggests that their ability to provide environmental
and conservation benefits have been relatively mixed. In respect
of Environmental Stewardship the picture is  similarly mixed, with
both positive and negative impacts on the supply of environ-
mental benefits identified. In particular, research has tended to
focus on the biodiversity impacts of common in-field, margin and
boundary options such as crop rotations, hedgerow management,
riparian buffer strips and winter stubble regimes on farmland birds
(e.g., Davey et al., 2010a,b; Field et al., 2010; Hinsley et al., 2010;
Siriwardena, 2010; Baker et al., 2012; Goodwin et al., 2013; Gruar
et al., 2013),  and to lesser extents on floristic diversity (e.g., Still and
Byfield, 2010; Morris et al., 2010), insect pollinators (e.g., Fuentes-
Montemayor et al., 2011; Critchley et al., 2013; Dunn et al., 2013;
Peyton et al., 2013), natural resource management (e.g., Ramwell
and Boatman, 2010), and ecosystem services (e.g., Rollett et al.,
2008; FERA, 2012).
Beyond biodiversity, other analyses have demonstrated that
participation in Environmental Stewardship can deliver both
human and social capital gains (Mills, 2012), whilst also enhancing
local employment and boosting the rural economy (Courtney et al.,
2013). Yet, it has also been established that the financial compen-
sation mechanism operated by Environmental Stewardship may
promote adverse selection as well as reduce the degree of environ-
mental benefits secured (Fraser, 2009; Quillérou et al., 2011).
Concerning ourselves with the principal agents involved (e.g.,
farmers, land managers, independent farm advisors and Natural
England) in the implementation of Environmental Stewardship,
research has generally favoured addressing the farmer element:
focusing primarily on understanding the views of farmers (e.g.
FERA, 2013a)  and their motivations for engagement in these
schemes (e.g. Mills et al., 2013) with little attention paid to inter-
mediaries (e.g., advisors)—particularly independent farm advisors.
Yet, drawing on evidence from payment for ecosystem service pro-
grammes (PES), a  similar mechanism to AES, clearly demonstrates
the importance of external advisors – especially as facilitators of
agreement processes between participants and contracting author-
ities –− due to their capacity to provide specialist knowledge and
skills (e.g., Ferraro, 2008; Thuy et al., 2010; Lin and Nakamura, 2012;
Huber-Stearns et al., 2013; Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Schomers
and Matzdorf, 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014).
In light of this, we posited that examining the farm advisor
dimension would represent an important and justified avenue of
exploration. By improving our understanding of the views and
opinions of farm advisors regarding Environmental Stewardship,
it may  be possible to  identify ways in  which to  improve the over-
all implementation and effectiveness of AES: aspects important
for achieving conservation objectives, public goods generation and
farm business viability. In this research on the English experience,
we report results from a survey designed to explore private farm
advisors’ views regarding their own  particular role in  the deliv-
ery of Environmental Stewardship agreements as well as their
opinions concerning farmers, Natural England and other facets of
Environmental Stewardship scheme implementation and opera-
tionalisation.
Our online survey adopted an exploratory approach, delving
into the ‘world’ of the farm advisor and concentrated on: (i) advi-
sors’ views regarding scheme constraints and client motivations
and behaviours; (ii) advisors’ modes of interaction with their clients
and Natural England; (iii) the determinants influencing the con-
tent of individual agreements; (iv) mechanisms for balancing client
needs and the provision of sufficient levels of environmental public
goods, and (v) recommendations for improving the delivery of AES.
It is important to  point out that this investigation tells only part
of a  much larger story. As  such, it should be viewed as the starting
point, the first stepping stone, to further, more in depth examina-
tions of the farm advisor role which by necessity would need to be
triangulate with the views of farmers, land managers and those of
Natural England.
2.  Background: evidence to  support our exploratory
approach
In concentrating on the areas (i–v) we were guided by evi-
dence highlighting key determinants of voluntary incentive scheme
operationalisation, implementation and effectiveness (e.g., Martin-
Ortega et al., 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014); the general purpose and
structure of AES (e.g., European Commission, 2005) and informed
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Fig. 1. Environmental Stewardship Framework co-opted and adapted from a  PES model by  Martin-Ortega et al. (2013).  The UK/England Stewardship Scheme is  placed within
the  European agricultural policy context expressed through the linkage with the CAP (Pillar 1 and Pillar 2). The Environmental Stewardship programme is divided into three
major component parts (actors, contracts and service delivery) with each of these subsequently subdivided into major constituent properties, characteristics and qualities.
The  framework also emphasises general interactions occurring between components parts as well as highlighting key interactions which are key foci of our survey.
by the particular arrangements and specifications of individual
Environmental Stewardship schemes (Natural England 2012a,b,c).
We combined these different strands to develop an Environmental
Stewardship framework (Fig. 1) to guide our survey. Reflecting this,
the composition of our survey is underpinned by  three major foci.
2.1. Actors and their interactions
2.1.1. Farmers: motivation, participation and knowledge
What motivates participants is important; indeed, it is  central to
their participation (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). Motivations under-
pinning farmer and land manager decision-making processes have
been identified as a complex mosaic of extrinsic and intrinsic values
(Siebert et al., 2006), as well as central to  delivering effective AES
programmes (Mills et al., 2013). The choices farmers make seem
to be influenced by a range of external factors like environmen-
tal policies; internal drivers such as personal characteristics (e.g.,
age, education) and farm features, as well as interactive elements
related to farm business arrangements and incentive design (Mills
et al., 2013). In particular, economic factors related to household
income, land tenure, family labour, and farm business structure
appear to be particularly influential determinants of participation
(Barreiro-Hurlé et al., 2010; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). These rep-
resent aspects frequently related to  the need to maintain family
and farm continuity (Farmar-Bowers and Lane, 2009; Ingram et al.,
2013). The extent to which this mix  of farm structural factors
and personal farmer characteristics influences AES participation is
affected by the likelihood of an agreement producing either major
or  minor changes to  farm operations, and consequently, the poten-
tial impacts these changes may  have on marginal profits, the size
of transaction costs incurred and the level of utility derived from
the delivery of environmental goods and services (Barreiro-Hurlé
et al., 2010). Overall, as Siebert et al. (2006:319) note:
“There is an intricate interaction of contingencies affected by
locality and specific context, such as agronomic, cultural, social
and psychological factors, which [. . .]  play interwoven roles in
each [. . .]  specific farm context”.
Similarly, alongside motivation, knowledge underpins success-
ful agriculture but the types of knowledge required for engagement
in particular land management activities can vary substantially
(Winter, 1997). For  example, as Ingram notes (2008a:224) in rela-
tion to  farmers’ knowledge of soil management:
“. . .although farmers are largely knowledgeable many appear
to lack the [.  . .] knowledge necessary for carrying out more
complex [.  . .]  management practices.”
Environmental stewardship more generally has been shown to
enhance farmer skills and environmental knowledge, awareness
and appreciation (Mills, 2012).
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2.1.2. Advisors and agencies
From this vantage the importance of both  public and private
advisory extension services and the advice they supply becomes
apparent (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). The role of external advisors
in bridging potential knowledge deficits, acting as a  necessary pre-
condition for realizing effective voluntary incentive schemes, and
delivering successful public policy interventions are widely recog-
nised (Juntti and Potter, 2002; Cooper et al., 2009; Vesterager and
Lindegaard, 2012). Advisors are now required to  explain regula-
tory processes and incentives as well as provide information and
training (Vesterager and Lindegaard, 2012). Indeed, the evidence
shows that informed farmers are  far more likely to participate in
AES (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). As Radley (2013) states, ‘good advi-
sors’ are central to the effectiveness of AES. Underscoring this point,
private advisors have been shown to positively impact the promo-
tion of both minor and major AES measures as well as influence
the willingness of farmers to adopt such measures (Lastra-Bravo
et  al., 2015). Considered more generally, the evidence indicates that
the  interactions between the actors (and agencies) involved in vol-
untary incentive schemes, operating across different institutional
levels, as well as the degree of decentralisation and devolution in
decision-making, are central to the functionality and effectiveness
of these interventions (e.g., Beckmann et al., 2009; Pascual et al.,
2010; Legrand et al., 2013).
2.2. Service delivery
2.2.1. Management practices and the provision of public goods
The financial rules and decision-making framing AES design are
central to how AES achieve environmental outcomes, economic
efficiency and widespread uptake (Beckmann et al., 2009). At  the
heart of AES lies the provision of public goods. The capacity of vol-
untary management interventions to  provide public goods rests
on the premise that  the measures specified by  these initiatives
are capable of generating the requisite environmental public goods
(i.e. ecosystem services) at scale; and moreover, that participants
(e.g., farmers) fully engage in  implementing those management
practices (Martin-Ortega et al., 2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014). Essen-
tially, it is about ensuring schemes are capable of demonstrating
additionality, or added value, over and above the business-as-usual
case in the absence of any intervention (Ghazoul et al., 2010).
Supplying public goods is  an essential function of the CAP; but
at the pan-European scale multiple environmental indicators sug-
gest these are currently being undersupplied (Cooper et al., 2009;
Pe’er et al., 2014).  With respect to  Environmental Stewardship there
has been considerable discussion regarding ELS option manage-
ment uptake and distribution, the inference being that this directly
affects their capacity to  facilitate the provision of sufficient envi-
ronmental public goods (e.g., Hodge and Reader, 2010).
Optimal spatial targeting of management options is a  key design
challenge faced by incentive schemes (Wünscher et al., 2008). The
reluctance of many EU/UK farmers to engage in significant envi-
ronmental management has also been shown to  inhibit uptake,
although certain activities are guaranteed under cross-compliance
(Rollett et al., 2008). Mechanisms to counteract these behavioural
dispositions have been developed (Chaplin and Radley, 2010), such
as:  restricted option choices under a  directed ELS regime (Boatman,
2013); focused initiatives like the ‘Making Environmental Steward-
ship More Effective’ programme (Blainey, 2013)  and the Campaign
for the Farmed Environment (Gibbs, 2010). To varying degrees they
have established that the delivery of environmental public goods
can  be enhanced (Boatman, 2013; Clothier, 2013; Defra and Natural
England, 2013; Jones and Boatman, 2013). Taking the long view,
however, there are those who argue that sustaining behavioural
change that results in  lasting environmental benefits remains a
significant challenge (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011).
2.3. Contracts
2.3.1. Agreement arrangements and conditions
Connected to  issues of uptake and public goods provision are
the other core elements of incentive scheme contracts, chiefly,
payments, monitoring and compliance (Danielsen et al., 2013;
Hejnowicz et al., 2014, 2015). The evidence clearly indicates that,
for schemes to  be effective, the payments entrants receive must
be consistent with, and sufficient to cover, the opportunity costs
they face through participation (Porras et al., 2013; Hejnowicz
et al., 2014). Consequently, in  the case of AES, public agencies
need to ensure that payments cover the operational and invest-
ment costs, production and profits foregone and private transaction
costs incurred by farmers (Falconer 2000; Mettepenningen et al.,
2009). This is  important because, for example, regarding the issue
of transaction costs, not  only do private transaction costs represent
a sizeable proportion of total AES-related costs but fixed transaction
costs also act as a  major contracting barrier (Falconer 2000; Ducos
et al., 2009; Mettepenningen et al., 2009). Financial incentives are
also key to  farmers signing up to longer-term AES agreements,
entering schemes that are more prescriptive and joining schemes
with significant layers of bureaucracy (Ruto and Garrod, 2009).
Hence the significance of payments should not be  underestimated,
as they directly impact overall income and the feasibility of  par-
ticipation (Wunder et al., 2008)  in addition to having fairness and
equity ramifications (Borner et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2010).
Providing a  sufficient incentive also helps to ensure a higher
degree of compliance; whilst this is  important the other major
factor that encourages greater compliance is the provision of con-
tracts with enforceable sanctions and penalties (Ferraro, 2008;
Wunder et al., 2008). Poor enforcement can often undermine
scheme performance (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Enforcement
only works if there is an adequate monitoring regime in  place, and
in  the case of Environmental Stewardship schemes this is recog-
nised to  require considerable improvement (Defra and Natural
England, 2008; Boatman et al., 2010; Chaplin and Radley, 2010;
Mountford et al., 2013; Radley, 2013). Collectively, these com-
plex institutional arrangements represent fundamental aspects of
the functioning and performance of any voluntary incentive pro-
gramme  (Hejnowicz et al., 2014, 2015).
3. Materials and methods
3.1. Data requirements
Our approach is  exploratory. We reasoned the most expedient
way to proceed to  obtain a  broad overview of farm advisors views
was to  use an online survey. In addition, due to the large number
(>900) of Environmental Stewardship advisors this also seemed the
most flexible and parsimonious choice. While interviews may  pro-
vide a  far  more extensive and nuanced description of farm  advisor
views, we felt that it was important to gather information from as
wide a  variety of advisors as possible: given potentially important
differences in  opinions that might arise due to regional differences
in  priorities or in  differences among advisors who specialized in ELS
or HLS schemes. We also anticipated that a broad-based approach
would identify specific issues and provide the necessary context to
conduct more focused qualitative interviews with farm advisors as
well as other agents in the process (e.g., farmers, Natural England
advisors) in the future.
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3.2. Sample
The sample was composed of Natural England registered stew-
ardship advisors whose contact information, which was publically
available, we obtained from Natural England’s register.1 After
removing duplicate entries the register included information for
958 individual advisors from eight regions of England (North East,
North West, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, South
East, South West, and Yorkshire & Humberside).
3.3. Survey instrument
The survey was constructed with Sawtooth Software’s (www.
sawtoothsoftware.com) SSI  web-based interviewing platform. A
pilot survey was tested on 24 stewardship advisors, three from each
of eight regions; responses from the pilot informed the design of
the final survey. The questions included in the survey explore those
issues previously discussed in Section 2.  The final survey (Support-
ing information S2) consisted of 39 questions divided into three
parts. Most questions were closed, involving selection of radio but-
tons (single answers) or checkboxes (multiple answers) but several
questions included space for providing extra comments.
More specifically, Part 1 requested advisors’ generic back-
ground information, including expertise. Part 2 focused on the
process of generating a  stewardship agreement and comprised
sub-sections covering advisors’ views regarding: client motivations
and knowledge; agreement preparation and constraints; inter-
actions with clients and Natural England; how advisors balance
farmer needs and Natural England objectives; and recommen-
dations for improving environmental stewardship agreements in
light of future changes to scheme delivery. Part 3 concentrated
on the environmental content of agreements, respondents’ views
regarding Natural England advisor amendments to submitted HLS
agreements, and advisors’ perceptions of client understanding and
acceptance of scheme payment levels and sanctions. Importantly,
participants were fully aware of what professional opinions were
being asked of them and could decide to opt-out at any stage of the
survey.
3.4. Survey implementation
Following standard social science survey protocol (Dilman et al.,
2009), Environmental Stewardship advisors were contacted up to
five times over a period of five weeks: (8th October to 7 November,
2013, with the survey open from 15 October to 15 November, 2013).
Invitation emails contained a  unique hypertext link enabling advi-
sors to access the survey directly (Supporting information S3). Of
958 advisors from the register, we  assumed that 840 had been
contacted after adjusting for 118 non-delivery email notifications.
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Advisor characteristics
4.1.1. Demographics, experience and regional distribution
A total of 354 respondents (42% of the sample) accessed the
online survey platform and 251 (29.9%) completed the full survey
(Supporting information Table S2). Given the number of completed
responses, we can be fairly confident that  the views expressed by
respondents in our ‘survey sample’ are  broadly representative of
those held by the ‘population sample’.
1 www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/farming/funding/es/agents/register.
aspx.
Respondents were asked to indicate the regions in  which they
operated, in  terms of commonality: 24.8% of indicated the South
West; 20.3% the West Midlands; 17.5% the East of England and
Yorkshire-Humberside; 16.3% the East Midlands and the South
East; 14.6% the North West; and 8.5% the North East. The major-
ity of respondents (75.3%) operated in one region, with only 14.0%,
5.6%, 2.8% and 2.0% working across two, three, four or five regions
respectively.
Relatedly, regions appeared to differ according to  their degree of
advisor mobility (Supporting information Table S3). In some loca-
tions advisors demonstrated a  more extensive ‘regional working
network’, operating across a number of different regions, whereas
in other cases these ‘networks’ were more limited. In the East Mid-
lands, for example, advisors exhibited the highest level  of mobility
with 60.0% working across additional regions. In the South West, on
the other hand, just 24.6% of advisors operated outside their own
region.
Advisor experience ranged considerably: from one to thirty
years. However, the majority of respondents (56.5%) worked in
an advisory capacity for 9.6  ± 5.6 yrs, although a large minor-
ity (39.04%) were considerably more experienced with 10–20
years of practice. Respondents operating across more regions also
appeared to have longer experience as farm advisors, for example,
14.6 ±  2.0 yrs for those working across four and five regions com-
pared to 9.4 ±  0.4 yrs for those working in a  single region. Generally
respondents indicated that they had knowledge and expertise in
relation to  two  (31.5%) or three (42.2%) Environmental Steward-
ship schemes, with proficiency in  ELS  (93.4%) and HLS (82.8%) being
the most common (Supporting Information Table S4). There were
distinctive patterns of regional expertise (Supporting Information
Table S5), probably reflecting the different geographies of these
regions as well as the more limited application of some schemes
compared to others (e.g., upland versions of ELS compared to  stan-
dard ELS schemes).
4.2. Agreement formation
4.2.1. Understanding clients: farmer motivations
Identifying the most common motivating factors leading farm-
ers and land managers to engage with Environmental Stewardship,
we found that advisors felt both extrinsic and intrinsic values
played a motivating role (Table 1). Evidence from previous research
indicates that farmers’ and land managers’ participation in vol-
untary agri-environment schemes is influenced by a variety of
attitudes and values (e.g. Siebert et al., 2006; Cross and Franks,
2007; Mills et al., 2013). Respondents ascribed a  heterogeneity of
motivations to  the decision-making processes underlying farmer
participation, this suggests connections to broader socio-cultural
norms, worldviews and goals (Ingram et al., 2013; Mills et al.,
2013)—advancing what Morris and Potter, 1995 term a  ‘participa-
tion spectrum’.
Building on the existing literature (e.g., Wilson and Hart 2000,
2001; Siebert et al., 2006; Cross and Franks, 2007; Defrancesco
et al., 2008; Mills et al., 2013; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015)  our anal-
ysis of advisor opinions suggests that extrinsic values such as
those related to financial gain, profit maximization, long-term
security and capital investment represent the primary motivators
encouraging farmer and land manager engagement with envi-
ronmental stewardship. These observations accord with evidence
from UELS agreement holders suggesting that scheme payments
act as the principal motivating factors determining participation,
with additional agronomic concerns such as the degree of  align-
ment with existing farm practices also influencing engagement
(CCRI, 2012). In this regard we identified so-called ‘calculating’ (i.e.,
purely financial), ‘opportunistic’ (i.e., income from existing prac-
tices), ‘optimizing’ (i.e., production potential of marginal land) and,
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Table  1
Stewardship advisor perceptions of client motivations.
Motivation classificationa,b Motivating factors
(key themes)
Primary reason
(%, n = 246)
Secondary reason
(%, n = 235)
Tertiary reason
(%,  n = 153)
Extrinsic
Financial incentives (Cal) Economics (i.e. income, finance, money, cash,
payment, compensation)
64.6 8.9 5.9
Profit  maximisation (Cal) Finance linked to farm viability and management 5.7 − −
Long-term security and farm viability (Opp) Continuation of current practices and extension of a
prior  environmental scheme
4.5 9.8 5.9
Capital
invest-
ment
(Opt)
Use  of unproductive marginal land (linkages to  finance
and profitability)
4.1 12.3 5.9
Finance linked to recouping monies from modulation 3.7 2.1 1.3
Income diversification 1.22 2.1 −
Capital works (e.g. finance, investment and
enhancements)
– 6.4 6.5
General improvement in farm management and
operations
– 3.8 7.8
Increase farm value – 1.7 1.3
Community image &  recognition in wider
society (Cat)
Prestige and public perception – − 1.9
Regulation (Com) Cross-compliance – 0.4 5.9
External non-regulatory obligation* Peer Pressure – 0.8 1.9
Encouragement from Natural England – 0.4 0.6
Intrinsic
Personal sense of environmental responsibility
and accountability (E)
Environmental benefits (e.g. biodiversity, wildlife,
conservation, farm environment)
13.8 39.2 35.3
Environmental benefits linked to improvements for
game and shooting
– 2.1 5.9
Obligation and responsibility (e.g. moral and
environmental aspect)
1.2 3.4 5.9
Commitment and interest in the
environment(E)
Personal satisfaction and interest – – 5.2
a Motivation classifications (i.e. extrinsic and intrinsic values) and sub-groupings are based on  Mills et  al. (2013).
b (Cal, Calculating), (Cat, Catalysing), (Com, Compensating), (E,  Engaged), (Opp, Opportunistic) and (Opt, Optimising) are categories referring to  modes of agri-environment
scheme  participation identified by Van Herzele et al. (2013).  See their paper for category explanations.
* This category is  not  identified by  Mills et al. (2013) but emerged from respondent comments.
to  a lesser extent, ‘compensatory’ (i.e., regulatory obligation) moti-
vating classifications as the primary drivers underlining farmer
participation reinforcing previous analyses (e.g., Pike, 2008, 2013;
Van Herzele et al., 2013).
Previous studies of AES participants have, for example, high-
lighted support for environmentally-oriented concepts such as
‘wildlife and environment’, ‘improving the landscape’ and ‘wildlife
conservation benefits’ (CCRI, 2012; FERA, 2013a). Indeed, a  positive
environmental attitude can be  a  component of farmers’ willing-
ness to engage with AES (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). Similarly,
respondents felt that intrinsic values were important secondary
and tertiary motivators underlying Environmental Stewardship
engagement, perhaps in this sense, complementing the more
widespread financially-oriented motivations which they proposed
that farmers hold: lending credence to the notion that extrinsic
and intrinsic values need not  be mutually exclusive (Mills et al.,
2013). To an extent this may  help temper concerns that without sig-
nificant intrinsic motivations farmers lack the necessary incentive
to deliver long-lasting environmental management improvements
(Van Herzele et al., 2013).
4.2.2. Farmers’ knowledge and advisor advice
Farmers’ capacity to undertake on-farm environmental man-
agement, in part, relies on their knowledge, skills and understand-
ing of those management requirements, although competencies
can vary significantly between individuals (Ingram, 2008a). Conse-
quently, there is  a  growing recognition that the provision of advice,
and the role of advisor, is central for helping farmers negotiate the
progressively more complex demands of environmental manage-
ment and agricultural production (Ingram, 2008b).
The majority of respondents (60.0%) indicated that 50% or more
of their clients had a  clear notion of the stewardship scheme
they wished to  enter. However, only 27.6% of respondents agreed
that a similar proportion of their clients also understood the
intricacies of agreement arrangement (i.e. with particular refer-
ence to the application process)—in this case advisors may  have
been referring to clients that were renewing agreements (FERA,
2013a). Interestingly, respondents’ views to both of these questions
also demonstrated a degree of regional variation, suggesting the
importance of context, although the over-arching picture remained
reasonably consistent (Supporting information Table S6). From an
advisor perspective, the assertion that famers express strong views
regarding the schemes they wish to  enter yet demonstrate more
limited understanding of scheme-related processes and procedures
should not, perhaps, be  a surprise—after all one of the reasons
famers employ independent advisors is  to help navigate the com-
plexity of scheme arrangements (Vesterager and Lindegaard, 2012).
For example, as one respondent (id: GRFPA2) remarked:
“Most clients have a  general idea of which scheme they would
like to  enter (i.e. ELS or ELS &  HLS) and the majority know the
basic options available under ELS & HLS. But  I have not met  one
client yet who has read each handbook (160 pages + in each)
from cover to  cover before I meet them so they do not realise the
complexities involved, particularly in HLS, nor do they always
realise the restrictions/requirements involved in the manage-
ment of some of the options. This always surprises me because
I would always want to know the details of something I  would
be committing to for 10 years especially given the financial and
management implications.”
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In light of this, it is hardly unexpected to find that; over-
all, respondents regarded their own advice as either ‘important’
(37.2%) or ‘very important’ (53.2%) for steering their clients towards
the most suitable Environmental Stewardship schemes. Perhaps
more surprising was the gender split between advisors, with 63.4%
of female respondents regarding their advice as ‘very important’
compared to 46.3% of their male counterparts. The reason for this
apparent gender-based difference is unclear, though it does sug-
gest that the potential role  of gender in  shaping professional advice
needs further exploration.
What we can say, however, is that although we expect respon-
dents to validate their own importance, the evidence seems to
suggest that the advice farmers receive can be beneficial. For
instance, information from UELS agreement holders points to
applicants requiring substantial amounts of advice (CCRI, 2012).
Likewise for ELS participants, salient advice has been shown to
be essential for enabling farmers to fulfil particular environmen-
tal management obligations (Lobley et al., 2010). Thematic analysis
of additional open-ended comments not  only supports this claim,
but further extends it by revealing the wide variety of reasons farm
advisors feel their advice is  necessary for aiding farmer decision-
making (Supporting information Table S7). These reasons include
ensuring farmers select the most appropriate type of stewardship
scheme and suite of environmental options; as respondent (id:
9V3PZG) clearly stated:
“Farmers are not  aware of all the options on offer for each
scheme (particularly HLS) and therefore which ones best suit
their farm and farming practices. They are also not aware of all
the management prescriptions in HLS as these are not in the
handbook.”
They also reflect the opinion that  farmers recognise the need
for technical input and appreciate, trust and prefer independent
advice; indeed, as one farm advisor (id: 5GHHXD) put it:
“They [that is  the farmer] prefer private advice rather than Nat-
ural England sponsored/contracted advisors as they rather pay
for impartial advice than possibly receive bias advice.”
There’s also a sense that respondents see their advice has hav-
ing wider significance for their client’s farming system too; a  view
advanced by respondent (id: ZJGWWD):
“.  . .other factors that ‘farmers’ need to  consider and reflect on
including tax implication of dual use and on their single pay-
ment, how their business structure is  arranged [.  . .],  the working
and timing of operations at the commencement of the agree-
ment, implications particularly under the HLS regarding the
reversion of arable to grass under several options that can affect
the capital value of their land. . .”
Many of these views are  reinforced by  farmers themselves (CCRI,
2012; FERA, 2013a).
4.3. Agreement practicalities
4.3.1. Application complexity
Respondents noted the variation in  application comple-
tion times (to the point of submission) between ELS, OELS
and UELS schemes, on the one hand, and HLS on the other
(Table 2)—illustrating the different labour demands these schemes
have. The majority of respondents (88.4%) indicated that ELS appli-
cations take 1–3 months to complete, while 51.6% thought that
completion times of between 4–9 months were more common for
HLS. ELS agreements could sometimes be completed within a  few
days or weeks because of the efficiency of the ELS online appli-
cation system. According to  open-ended survey responses, major
thematic factors contributing to the longer completion times of HLS
agreement included: the requirement for detailed surveys (i.e., the
Farm Environment Plan [FEP]); farm complexity and holding size;
the need for meetings with Natural England (as well as Natural
England’s capacity and decision-making); draft agreement checks;
problems associated with rural land registry mapping, and obtain-
ing  historic environment record reports promptly. As one advisor
(id: YMEVCN) commented:
“For ELS schemes; the application process is  usually very quick
− the application forms are available immediately online (or
within a week on paper) then they usually take just a few
hours to complete. Natural England then process the applica-
tion to Agreement within 6 to 8 weeks. For  HLS; often first
contact is  made up to or over a year in  advance of  the start
of the Agreement. After this, the FEP must be carried out at the
most appropriate time (e.g., mid-late June in  species rich hay
meadows or March/April on breeding wader ground). It’s then
necessary to delay the submission of the application until after
the FEP has been completed and approved (easily 8 to 12 weeks).
It can then be another 8 to  12 weeks from the Agreement to
be drawn-up by the HLS Adviser and studied in  detail by  the
applicant before it goes live.”
The complexity of the application process represents a  signif-
icant issue in the design and effectiveness of HLS, in  particular,
the task of undertaking and producing the FEP (Defra and Natural
England, 2008). Yet 74.4% of respondents agreed that  the FEP was
‘important’ or ‘very important’ to the subsequent design of HLS
agreements. In addition, 57.6% of respondents indicated that the
advice delivered by the FEP grant to farmers and land managers was
‘effective’ or ‘highly effective’. The centrality of FEP to construct-
ing agreements was  confirmed in an HLS monitoring programme
(FERA, 2013b; Mountford et al., 2013).
Open-ended comments provided a  mixture of views with some
respondents arguing the value of the FEP, especially its usefulness
for: mapping features and selected options; indicating the value
of a holding; enabling advisors to advise on marginal areas of the
holding and become familiar with the whole farm; and providing
the ecological evidence base to support the correct choice of  HLS
options and indicators. As advocated by respondent (id: RG5J9W)
the FEP represents a:
“Very useful exercise for the adviser to  get a  really good under-
standing of the farm, what is  there and the farming system in
place: it gives you the knowledge to  sit down with the farmer
and talk knowledgeably about their farm and make suggestions,
also great to  be able to tell them something they don’t know
and helps to build a  good relationship for developing a  quality
scheme.”
On the other hand, some took a more critical stance citing that
the FEP was too time-consuming to  produce and collected too much
unnecessary information (FERA, 2013b). For  example, as respon-
dent (id: FJMNC3) notes succinctly:
“I completed a FEP for a  farm. . .where over 75% of the FEP was
irrelevant to the plan that was finally agreed. Natural England
knows what it wants to focus on − there is  no point in wasting
time mapping areas that are irrelevant to  a  future scheme.”
Still, others claimed that the FEP was not always read in  detail by
Natural England project officers; did not properly consider the farm
business, and was not used following approval −  a view articulated
by respondent (id: LDHK8D):
“We  get the impression that the FEP is  not read in detail by many
NE project officers, and that  the end stewardship agreement is
worked up  by verbal discussion rather than by close reference
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Table  2
Average time taken by respondents to  complete Environmental Stewardship agreements (applications).
ES Scheme (% of Advisors, n = 250)
1–3 months 4–6 months 7–9 months 10–12 months 1  year + I don’t know
ELS 88.4 4.4  0.0 0.4  0.0 6.8
OELS  57.2 4.8  1.2 0.0 0.0 36.8
U(O)ELS 39.6 4.0 1.6 1.2 0.4 53.2
HLS 20.4 30.4 21.2 8.8 5.6  13.6
to the FEP −  hence I rate the FEP as ‘important’, but not ‘very
important’.”
To some extent these views leave a  question mark over whether
efforts to simplify FEP methodology and recording have been as
successful as originally envisaged (Defra and Natural England,
2008).
Cost and time were identified as the most common principal
constraints relating to  the preparation and submission of Environ-
mental Stewardship applications (Table 3). Administrative burdens
magnify the transaction costs of HLSs, particularly due to  labour-
intensive activities such as the FEP. Past surveys of both ELS and
UELS agreement holders highlighted that the bureaucracy and com-
plexity of schemes are perceived as daunting and can reduce the
number of potential applicants (Cross and Franks, 2007; CCRI, 2012;
FERA, 2013a).  Reducing scheme complexity and procedures is the
most effective means of curtailing transaction costs and increasing
AES uptake by farmers (Mettepenningen et al., 2009). In this survey,
62.5% of respondents ‘somewhat agreed’ or ‘highly agreed’ that the
HLS process needed to be  simplified, while a  further 80.2% agreed
that farmers and land managers perceived the process of apply-
ing for environmental stewardship (in particular HLS) as too time
consuming and complicated. This resonates with requests to make
future Rural Development Programme funding applications far
simpler and manageable through, for example, improving available
guidance and streamlining application processes and requirements
(Defra, 2013).
4.3.2. Advisor roles
Our analysis indicated that respondent interaction (i.e., com-
munication) differed according to agreement type and the
corresponding actor. Respondents noted that all Environmental
Stewardship schemes involved significant client interaction. How-
ever, respondents indicated that ELS, OELS and U(O)ELS schemes
involved less client interaction (64.8%–77.6% ‘high’ to ‘very high’)
compared to HLS  schemes (95.5% ‘high’ to ‘very high’).
In the context of a ‘knowledge exchange encounter’ (Ingram,
2008b) studies of advisor-farmer interactions have previously
emphasised the power imbalance in  that relationship, char-
acterising the advisor as a prospective exploiter; however,
following significant privatisation of advisory services farmer
demand is potentially reframing that asymmetric power dynamic
(Ingram, 2008b). Respondents suggested that interactions between
themselves and their clients proceeded based on mutual decision-
making (62.0%), or to a  lesser extent according to their own
requirements (27.0%). Advisors described their interactions with
clients mainly in terms of client need (54.0%); with the frequency of
interactions being mainly ‘sufficient’ (40.8%) and/or ‘above average
compared to other professionals’ (28.8%).
The emerging narrative suggests that  agreement preparation is
not simply a series of box ticking exercises and procedures but also
a social process. As  Ingram (2008b:414) noted, with respect to the
relational interaction between farmers and agronomists:
“. . .the practice the farmer implements is  a  negotiated or facil-
itated outcome between agronomists and farmer rather than a
rigid prescriptive practice “‘adopted’” by  the farmer.”
Reinforcing this view, most respondents (80.0%) described the
process of agreement preparation as a  negotiation between client
needs and their expert advice, with clients being relatively flexible
on the type of scheme (49.2%) and environmental objectives (56.1%)
they would adopt. For  example, as one advisor (id: D77SEQ) noted:
“Negotiation is the key to success − one needs to  be  able to
understand the farm, the farmer and then the reasons for being
invited and work out a  scheme that will achieve success for both
parties.”
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of advisors (92.0%) indi-
cated that clients demonstrated a  high degree of openness towards
their advice. This suggests that farmers are a  relatively pragmatic
group – open to being persuaded on a  range of possible recommen-
dations concerning the type and composition of the agreements
they enter – and that in this respect advisors can have an important
role in guiding farmer-decision making processes. For example, evi-
dence from UELS agreement holders suggests that a  fifth of  their
option uptake is a  result of external advice (CCRI, 2012).  Likewise,
ELS agreement holders have previously stated that advice is:
“.  . .very useful for both option choice and option management”
(FERA, 2013a:5).
In  comparison with their clients, the levels interaction respon-
dents had with Natural England advisors were substantially lower
for ELS, OELS and UELS schemes (8.4% to 11.7% very low to
low) but remained similar for HLS (82.0% high to very high).
The vast majority (92.7%) of advisors indicated that they knew
they could contact Natural England for information and advice if
and when required. Their reasons for doing so were many and
varied (Table 4); however, thematic analysis indicated that  they
were commonly related to  issues concerning: clarification and
guidance on scheme options, appropriateness and suitability; Nat-
ural England requirements/expectations for the farm area and
application-related issues, details and administrative checks (e.g.
help, advice, specific codes, vendor numbers etc.). Overall, addi-
tional comments verified that observed differences in the levels
of interaction respondents had with clients and Natural England
reflected the underlying complexity of the Environmental Stew-
ardship schemes.
4.4. Environmental stewardship performance
4.4.1. Public goods: promoting environmental objectives in entry
level stewardship
Delivering public goods implies a degree of spatial optimisation
to generate the requisite magnitude and distribution of environ-
mental benefits (Garrod et al., 2012). There has been widespread
discussion regarding the effectiveness of ELS option uptake and
management activities in  relation to realizing environmental ben-
efits and value for money (Defra and Natural England, 2008; Hodge
and Reader, 2010; Jones et al., 2010). In particular, arguments for
increased integration of options across the landscape have been
proposed (Chaplin and Radley, 2010),  with research suggesting that
farmers would buy into collaborative AES (Emery and Franks, 2012;
McKenzie et al., 2013).
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Table 3
Common constraints (C) identified by  respondents in relation to Environmental Stewardship application preparation and submission processes.
Constraints (Emergent Themes) C1  (%,  n =  248) C2 (%,  n = 211) C3  (%, n =  145) C4 (%, n = 76) C5 (%, n = 40)
Cost (e.g. for clients) 20.6 15.6 4.8 3.9 2.5
Time  (e.g. application preparation and submission) 34.7 16.1 6.9 6.6 2.5
Time  and cost 6.1 3.8  1.4 0.0 0.0
Costs  versus potential rewards of scheme participation 3.2 1.9  2.1 3.9 0.0
Costs  associated with implementing scheme options 0.0 4.3  3.5 6.6 2.5
Suitability and alignment with current farming practices (e.g. extent to which
farming practices may need to be altered)
8.5 6.6  4.8 5.3 7.5
Farmer  preferences, decision-making and expectations of scheme benefits 2.4 1.9 4.1 1.3 0.0
Farmer willingness to  engage in the application process and implement
scheme requirements
1.6 7.1  6.2 7.9 17.5
Farmer understanding, knowledge and awareness of schemes 0.4 2.4  4. 2.6 2.5
Scheme  capacity to be effective and inherent limitations (e.g. environmental
option choices and flexibility)
2.4 7.6  11.7 14.5 10.0
Scheme complexity (e.g. in preparation and implementation) 2.4 4.7 14.5 10.5 10.0
Mapping, visualisation tools, information procurement and surveying 5.6 3.3  8.3 2.6 5.0
Natural England 2.8 8.0  8.9 7.9 10.0
Farm  limitations and suitability (e.g. size and features) 3.6 3.8  2.8 13.2 0.0
Bureaucracy (e.g. red tape) 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0
Scheme  funding availability (e.g. in relation to  capital works) 0.4 0.5  2.8 2.6 0.0
Other  4.0 9.0  8.9 7.9 27.5
Table 4
Common reasons (R) respondents identified for contacting Natural England during agreement preparation.
Emergent Themes R1 (%, n = 237) R2 (%,  n = 201) R3 (%,  n =  144) R4 (%, n = 59) R5 (%, n =  20)
Clarification and guidance on scheme options, appropriateness and suitability 23.2 16.4 13.2 8.5 20.0
Target  options, priorities and features for the local area 6.3 6.0  2.8 1.7 –
Mapping-related issues 8.0  4.0  3.5 5.1 –
Natural England requirements/expectations for the farm area 12.7 6.5 2.8 6.8 5.0
Permission, approval and success of submitted application 3.8 2.0  2.1 – –
Application-related issues, details and administrative checks (e.g. help, advice,
specific codes, vendor numbers etc.)
10.5 7.0  4.9 10.2 10.0
Farm-related features, characteristics and aspects for inclusion in applications 9.3 4.5 5.6 1.7 5.0
Information related to  previous applications and current
on-farm/neighbouring farm schemes in operation (i.e. practices,
compatibility etc.)
4.2 5.0  4.2 – –
Budgetary availability, flexibility and constraints 2.1 2.5 4.2 1.7 –
Clarification of scheme rules and regulations 2.5 1.5 0.7 1.7 –
FEP/FER/HER related matters 2.5 4.0  8.3 3.4 5.0
Time  scale of application submission/deadlines 1.7 3.5 5.6 6.8 5.0
Time  scale for management options 0.4  –  – – –
Time  to meet clients 0.4 0.5  – 1.7 5.0
Information and discussions regarding designated sites 1.3 3.0  1.4 5.1 –
Software/technical issues 0.4  0.5  – 1.7 –
Landowner-related matters (e.g. interest, commitment etc.) 0.4  2.0  4.9 5.1 5.0
Eligibility of land for Stewardship schemes and options 3.8 2.0  1.4 – –
Field  data, measurements and information 1.3 1.5 1.4 3.4 –
ELS schemes are  designed to  achieve five broad environmental
objectives: wildlife conservation (WC); landscape quality & char-
acter (LQ & C—particularly in relation to water); protection of the
historic environment (PHE); natural resource conservation (NRC,
particularly in relation to soil) and climate mitigation and adapta-
tion (CM & A). We  asked respondents to  identify the environmental
objectives most frequently met  by the agreements they have been
involved with (Table 5). Clearly, there are some that appear to  be
being met  more than others. This suggests differences in  the way
agreements fulfil specific objectives and provide a comprehensive
range of environmental benefits (Radley, 2013).
For example, 94.0% of respondents indicated that most ELS
schemes in which they have been involved fulfil WC objectives,
whereas only 4.  8% identified CM & A as being similarly fulfilled. This
trend is also observed at the regional scale. It appears most appli-
cations (48.0%) focus on WC,  LQ & C and PHE or  WC,  LQ & C and NRC
(27.6%) environmental objectives. This supports previous agree-
ment holder surveys indicating that ‘farmland wildlife’, ‘wildlife
conservation benefits’ and ‘resource protection’ were important
environmental issues affecting agricultural land (FERA, 2013a).
To some extent variations in  meeting particular environmental
objectives may  be a reflection of the outcomes of directed fund-
ing streams. For example, significant investments (approximately
Table 5
Environmental objectives fulfilled by Environmental Stewardship agreements.
Environmental objectives Presence in stewardship application (%, n =  250) Commonly met  environmental objectives (%)
WC 94.0 WC,  LQ &  C, PHE 48.0
LQ  & C 87.2 WC,  LQ &  C, NRC 27.6
PHE 67.2 WC,  PHE, NRC 11.2
NRC 48.8 LQ & C,  PHE,  NRC 4.0
CM & A 4.8 – –
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£200 million) have been channelled towards historic environment
conservation activities since 2005 (Natural England, 2014). They
may  also be a consequence of sectoral variation in  agreement and
option uptake (Defra and Natural England, 2008).
It is certainly the case that most respondents (87.0%) regard their
role as achieving the ‘best’ agreement for their client. What ‘best’
actually refers to needs further exploration; however, in  this con-
text there is the potential for farmer-advisor co-alignment: either
to increase or decrease the environmental ambition of an agree-
ment. One argument raised is  that when advisors want to avoid
losing the trust of farmers or negatively impacting farmer incomes
they may  focus on bolstering current on-farm agricultural prac-
tices (e.g., Sutherland et al., 2013). For instance, as respondent (id:
8RAV9H) stated:
“I  see my  role  as trying to  fit the scheme with the farming prac-
tices/available labour/capabilities & experience of the applicant.
My aim is to  enhance them all, and to  ensure the success of them
all.”
The majority of respondents (51.4%) stated that 50% or more
of the applications they had been involved with included specific
environmental objectives based on their priority status, implying
that advisors strongly argued for the environmental component
and/or that those farmers regarded this as important. As one ardent
‘green’ thinking advisor (id: TGGE35) commented:
“I try to only work with those people that are truly engaged
with the principles of Stewardship. If they are  constantly trying
to find ways out of doing what is  necessary I explain that I can’t
help them and leave.”
However, for a  significant minority (48.59%) this was not the
case, suggesting that advisors either failed to effectively promote
and push the environmental argument or, that even if a  forceful
argument was presented; farmers considered other factors to be of
greater bearing on  their decision-making. A sentiment supported
by respondent (id: 725VQ8) who acknowledge that:
“It depends if you are tuned into each other’s objectives. I  do
this with the aim of improving and promoting good environ-
mentally sound farming practice − which has been in serious
decline since the 80s.  If my  clients are similarly inclined, my
advice is important and relevant. If they are not of the same
opinion, my  advice/persuasion falls on deaf ears and is  of little
importance.”
Regarding the latter, although we  suggested in Section 4.3.2
that advisors were well placed to influence farmer decision-
making – given the level of openness to advice they purportedly
demonstrated – respondents identified a range of other significant
farm-related factors that strongly affected farmers’ decision-
making rationale to include/exclude specific management options.
The most commonly identified reasons advisors noted were those
connected to farm system compatibility. For example, environmen-
tal objectives are easy to implement (88.4%); is/are an extension
of current farm practices (84.3%), do not significantly impact on
the day to day farm routine (84.3%), provide a  higher points
value (67.1%) and requires few man  hours (49.4%). Advisors seem
to be indicating that farmers are predisposed towards selecting
options that do not significantly influence their farm business
(FERA, 2013a), bolstering the idea that the primary predictors of
option uptake are agricultural related factors (Hodge and Reader,
2010). Moreover, it supports the generally articulated view of AES
that there is a:
“. . .disjuncture between the policy’s supposedly overarching
environmental rationale and its realisation in practice through
the actions and behaviours of land managers” (Juntti and Potter,
2002:216).
On the other hand, 80.0% of respondents also agreed that
in preparing ELS and HLS agreements they needed to balance
both client and Natural England needs. However, overall, opin-
ion was split as to whether a stewardship agreement reflected
the preferences of their clients or the priorities of Natural Eng-
land. Nevertheless, when viewed through the lens of gender and
expertise differences did emerge. For example, a  higher percent-
age of male respondents (46.3%) compared to female respondents
(30.7%) agreed that agreements were more reflective of client pref-
erences than Natural England. In fact; on this issue, the distribution
of responses between male and female advisors was  significantly
different (H(2) =  7.56, df = 1,  p  =  0.006). However, when considering
advisor expertise, those with wider experience of Environmen-
tal Stewardship schemes were more inclined to  disagree with
this position (44.7–54.3%) compared to those with less expertise
(30.0–33.8%).
Importantly, 53.2% of respondents acknowledged that there was
an inherent conflict between client needs and Natural England pri-
orities, a  pattern similarly observed if disaggregated by  gender and
expertise. This is  significant, because it points toward an inherent
tension in how agreements meet their statutory obligations whilst
acknowledging that, to  some degree, they must also co-align with
farmer and land manager needs. Although it would require further
investigation, it is conceivable that these various decision-making
trade-offs may  contribute to the skewed pattern of option uptake
observed elsewhere (e.g., Boatman et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2010;
Radley, 2013).
To an extent our results add weight to  the contention that the
voluntary nature of Environmental Stewardship schemes, and their
option menus, predispose farmers to undertake only those environ-
mental management activities that would have occurred in their
absence (i.e., a  lack of additionality); specifically, by subscribing to
those practices that fit easily into existing farm activities − leading
to  the possibility of adverse selection in option choices where the
envisaged level of environmental benefits cannot be guaranteed
(Hodge and Reader, 2010). For example, research has found that:
“. . .farmers thought that 61% of features in  ELS option would
be managed the same if they had not gone into ELS” (FERA,
2013a:9).
And furthermore, that between 21% and 52% of management
work, in  financial terms, would have occurred ‘in the absence of
the scheme’ (Courtney et al., 2013).
4.4.2. Alteration of agreements: the case of HLS
A profusion of advisory services stretching across public and
private sectors presents both challenges and opportunities: a plu-
ralistic resource of diverse competencies enriching advice and
extending the ‘agricultural knowledge system’; yet also providing
an opportunity for fragmentation, duplication, and incoherence in
policy and delivery; encouraging greater competition between ser-
vice providers and leading to  confusion amongst farmers (Juntti and
Potter, 2002; Sutherland et al., 2013). How these play out in  prac-
tice can significantly influence the environmental performance of
agreements (Sutherland et al., 2013).
It is reasonable to posit that  there are different points in the Envi-
ronmental Stewardship process where the content of  agreements
can be revised. First, there are those opportunities that arise dur-
ing agreement preparation, specifically, in relation to  the dialogue
between farmers, private advisors, and Natural England officers.
Second, alterations can be made to applications post-submission
when they are being reviewed by Natural England (here we  are
particularly referring to  HLS applications). At this juncture, it is pos-
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sible that agreements may  be altered to favour Natural England’s
environmental agenda and priorities—potentially shifting the pre-
submission content away from more farmer-centric interests.
With this in mind, we asked respondents with experience of
HLS agreements (n = 212) to comment on the extent to  which
Natural England advisors made alterations to the environmental
content of HLS applications between the original and final approved
application. Although some respondents (17.9%) specified that Nat-
ural England advisor decisions did not lead to  any alterations
in environmental content, the majority of respondents indicated
that  the environmental management composition of applications
was either ‘somewhat different’ (40.1%) or ‘moderately different’
(38.7%). Notably, from the standpoint of transparency, a  majority
of respondents (56.3%) declared that Natural England ‘very often’
or ‘always’ informed them about changes that had been made:
“I have without exception found the Natural England advisors
very helpful and communicative at all stages of the long pro-
cess it takes to  put an application into practice.” (Respondent
id: WSGZAM)
Listing reasons as to why Natural England advisors altered the
environmental content of submitted HLS applications, respondents
expressed a range of views with several themes emerging (Table 6).
The most frequently cited themes related to changes in  Natural Eng-
land’s environmental agenda (23.7%), financial and cost constraints
(20.3%), and the calibre of Natural England advisors (11.6%).
It is possible, of course, that Natural England modifications to
HLS applications do improve their environmental content:
“I work very closely with Natural England and know advisors
personally. Although they work to targets they seem to aim for
the best ‘wildlife’ options overall.” (Respondent id: HT2RJQ)
Furthermore, a previous assessment of 174HLS agreements
indicated that they were generally ‘well designed’ with 80%
of  agreements deemed likely to  be effective in  achieving most
outcomes: in each of these cases it is  likely that there was  consid-
erable Natural England oversight in the delivery of these schemes
(Mountford et al., 2013). Conversely, extensive prescriptive revi-
sions to AES have been shown to produce ‘excessive uniformity’ in
habitat management which can undermine biodiversity as well as
negatively affect farmer participation (Radley, 2013). The impact
on farmers may  be potentially quite severe, as respondent (id:
2NUE5U) strongly argued:
“Often the client has already committed to a  huge expense to
undertake the scheme that they feel they have to  accommodate
the changes in  order to achieve a return. Many are bullied into
the changes. This is ineffective as it doesn’t take into account if
the changes can be managed effectively which can lead to failure
in the long term.”
The majority of respondents (87.9%) expressed the opinion that
they should be included in the discussions leading to changes
in finalized HLS agreements. Similarly, 82.2% of respondents dis-
agreed with the notion that it was appropriate for Natural England
to make modifications to  HLS applications without their input (Sup-
porting Information Table S8). For some advisors involvement is a
question of process and procedure:
“If Natural England discuss with advisor then the advisor can
understand the rationale and will be able to use advice on other
applications. Sometimes the discussions with Natural England
can lead to them reverting to  original option.” (Respondent id:
3US4XH)
Yet, for other respondents, it is  about mitigating inefficiencies
and the potential straining of relations:
“I’ve had farmers very upset not  understanding the changes
and then creating a  silly 3 way  discussion where it is  not easy
to know exactly what has been said. It makes sense to have a
proper open communication system. The farmer has employed
me, why suddenly change to excluding the agent. This varies
according to the NE officer.” (Respondent id: TFEPJJ)
Nevertheless, Natural England is  the statutory authority in
charge of implementing Environmental Stewardship and as such
oversees the final decisions regarding individual applications—they
represent the legitimate institutional authority. It is  interesting,
therefore, that advisors should feel entitled to have a  greater influ-
ence over Natural England decision-making. The reasons behind
this require further investigation.
Linked to  these comments, 60.8% of respondents viewed Natu-
ral England’s modifications of HLS agreements as not made in the
interests of their clients. In fact, 68.8% of respondents thought that
revisions to HLS applications were made to favour Natural Eng-
land interests (Supporting information Table S8). This point was
forcefully conveyed by one advisor (id: MLZEYT) who commented
that:
“In my  experience they are ALWAYS made to save money and
not in  the best interests of the client or the environment and,
if truth be known, not in the best interests of Natural England
either in  the long term.”
Equally, however, some advisors noted the difficult position
Natural England advisors faced:
“Advisors are in the awkward position of trying to  achieve
Government objectives, habitat and species protection and
encouraging land owners to enter the schemes. Advisors work
hard to  get as much for the money as possible and farmers want
as much money as possible.” (Respondent id: QK59MK)
4.4.3. Payments, costs and income
Financial incentives are a central tool in steering farmers’ private
interests to  provide particular public goods, but to achieve their
desired outcome payment levels must account for the opportunity
and transaction costs that farmers might incur on entering volun-
tary schemes (Cooper et al., 2009). Stewardship schemes provide
different standard payment amounts. Little consensus emerged in
our survey regarding respondents’ perspectives on whether clients
were satisfied with ELS payments (Supporting information Table
S9). There was a  sense from some open-ended responses that
farmer expectations remain too high, with an attitude of  ‘maxi-
mum gain and minimal cost/impact’. For example, as one advisor
remarked:
“They [i.e. farmers] would always be happier with more!”
(Respondent id: 7KMC97)
Other advisors observed that payments were sufficient so  long
as other farming business opportunities were not compromised:
“The £30/ha for ELS is  ok provided there is not serious compe-
tition for more productive uses.” (Respondent id: 4DQMRP)
On  the whole there was more general agreement among advi-
sors that clients were satisfied with the standard payment amounts
for OELS, UELS and HLS (Supporting information Table S9).  Having
said that there were also clear differences of opinion, with one farm
advisor suggesting that farmers might be overpaid:
“HLS payments are too high for the land based options in  the
uplands. Extremely large annual payments for delivering very
little benefit.” (Respondent id: LGQECT)
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Table  6
Emergent themes describing the possible reasons (R) for HLS  application modifications.
Emergent themes R1(%, n = 187) R2(%, n =  116) R3(%, n =  64) R4(%, n =  13) Importance Across Reasons (%)
Changes in Natural England targets and priorities for HLS 26.7 22.4 21.8 0.0 23.7
Budgetary/cost/financial constraints 22.9 18.9 12.5 30.8 20.3
Natural England advisor decision-making, viewpoint and knowledge 9.6 14.7 12.5 7.7 11.6
Other  8.7 12.9 14.1 15.4 11.1
Environmental option suitability 6.9 2.6 7.8 0.0 5.5
Farmers changed their minds 2.7 4.3 9.4 0.0 4.2
Conflict between HLS options and other scheme objectives 4.3 3.4 4.7 0.0 3.9
Farmer  and NE negotiated changes 2.1 5.2 4.7 7.7 3.7
HLS  prescriptions too burdensome 1.6 5.2 4.7 15.4 3.7
Too little evidence to justify & differences of opinion concerning option
inclusion
1.6 4.3 4.7 7.7 3.2
Environmental option eligibility 4.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 2.4
Application mistakes 2.1 2.6 1.6 0.0 2.1
Rarely  are changes/adjustments made prior to submission 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
Too  many similar options included in HLS  applications 1.6 0.9 0.0 7.7 1.3
Inclusion of too many options (overly ambitious application) 0.5  1.7 1.6 7.7 1.3
Whilst in stark contrast, one respondent commented that the
present level of HLS payments questions the scheme’s viability:
“HLS payments in recent years have been ‘trimmed’ down to the
state that with some schemes the annual return has been so low
as to make the scheme non-viable for the farmers.” (Respondent
id: 7KDH6Y)
However, by  and large, with regards to payment satisfaction our
results seem to accord with the 66% of UELS agreement holders that
considered scheme payments to be ‘generous’ or  ‘sufficient’ (CCRI,
2012). Ultimately, as respondent (id: P8XVWR) indicates:
“If they [i.e. farmers] were not happy they would not enter an
agreement.”
Some studies claim farmers view Environmental Stewardship
as an income top-up and stabilizer (a form of income security),
particularly in instances where the farm business is vulnerable
(Mills, 2012). In others, it has been argued that ELS entry may  incur
modest costs rather than adding to  income (Udagawa et al., 2014).
Our results suggest that respondents straddle both of these per-
spectives, as advisors were generally split over whether payments
afforded their clients an adequate income stream or not  (Support-
ing information Table S9), although one advisor did comment that:
“Some. . .farmers look on stewardship payments as income, but
I do point out to them that they are required to  work for their
money − it’s not just a  free hand-out.” (Respondent id: LDHK8D)
However, when specifically reflecting upon the connection
between payments and costs (e.g., labour and materials), 56.6% of
advisors suggested that clients considered payments insufficient
to adequately cover changing input costs versus only 21.1% that
thought the contrary. This view was echoed in  open-ended com-
ments, with some advisors stating payments did  not reflect recent
‘escalations in commodity prices’ or ‘cost increases due to inflation’,
for example:
“Payments should be index linked. A  payment of £30/ha might
have been acceptable 5 years ago, but costs have gone up a  lot
yet scheme incomes have remained the same.” (Respondent id:
4A29YS)
Others emphasised that ELS payments were ‘not cost effective
for arable farmers’ and that ‘crop values and greening measures will
make it harder to  encourage renewals’, as one advisor outlined:
“Payments are now seen as too low particularly in  intensive
arable areas where a typical comment is  that ‘it’s hardly worth
the hassle’.” (Respondent id: 6EATTB)
This is  supported by evidence indicating that cereal incomes
may  be unduly affected by entering ELS schemes (Udagawa et al.,
2014), as a  respondent noted:
“The £30/ha on ELS was set at a  time  of low cereal prices and
was  to compensate for income forgone − in  light of much higher
prices for crops this aspect needs re-visiting.” (Respondent id:
4NGVTB)
While this may  be the case other studies have suggested that the
percentage of farmers who regard payments as sufficient to cover
their costs has grown since 2005 (FERA, 2013a).
Adopting a  regional perspective revealed statistically significant
heterogeneities in respondents’ views regarding scheme payment
levels as well as income and input costs (Supporting information
Table S10, Figs. S1  and S2). These regional patterns likely reflect
individual respondent experiences of specific farm-level socio-
economic characteristics as well as the distinctive rural and wider
economic circumstances encountered in these locations (see Farm
Business Survey).2 The implication seems to be that payment lev-
els ought to  account for these differences, and thus better reflect
regional level conditions and farm business circumstances. Over-
all, advisors’ comments suggest that  payment levels are  a real issue
for farmers, in particular, whether the costs incurred actually make
entry level schemes unsustainable in  the long-term (Udagawa et al.,
2014).
4.4.4. Compliance: penalties and sanctions
The successful provision of public goods relies on individuals
complying with contractual arrangements: this requires agree-
ments to have monitoring and conditionality elements (Hejnowicz
et al., 2014). We  queried respondents regarding elements of  condi-
tionality (i.e., sanctions and penalties) and found that, although a
majority, only 51.4% agreed that their clients understood the extent
of the penalties that may  be applied should they fail  to fully com-
ply with agreements (Supporting information Table S9). Notably, a
sizeable minority of advisors (33.9%) thought the opposite.
Additional commentary raised a  number of issues; for example,
some advisors alleged that farmers and land managers, although
aware penalties could be applied in  cases of non-compliance, were
often ignorant of the scope sanctions could take: partly as a  conse-
quence of the rules being over-complicated and poorly explained:
“Farmers are often oblivious to the penalties that would be
applied for non-compliance. However, there are  very few which
would knowingly flout the rules and often farmers are found to
2 http://www.farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/regional/.
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be non-compliant only as a result of them not being aware of all
of the requirements of the complicated scheme (particularly in
the case of HLS).” (Respondent id: YMEVCN)
On closer inspection this observation does seem rather puzzling,
surely the expectation is  that part of the service advisors provide
includes spelling out the likely repercussions of non-compliance?
If an explanatory deficit exists then surely this rests, in part, on the
shoulders of farm advisors themselves? Certainly some advisors
made the effort to inform their clients of non-compliance related
issues but hinted at the fact that, in their opinion, ‘not.  . .many other
advisors do this’ and also with regards to farmers ‘it’s amazing how
quickly some of them forget!’.
Picking up on the latter point, ignorance and deliberate avoid-
ance have been identified as issues for farmers failing to meet
agreement prescriptions, a  reality that would seem to support the
contention that agreement holders ought to  have better access to
training in order for them to  more closely adhere to agreement con-
ditions (FERA, 2013a). The provision of training has been shown to
positively influence farmer behaviour and management activities
(Jones et al., 2013).
Training, however, may  not be sufficient because, as some
respondents disclosed, a  number of their clients took a  fairly
relaxed, even recalcitrant, stance towards compliance issues due
to poor monitoring and enforcement:
“Past monitoring of schemes has been poor − I think some farm-
ers believe they are unlikely to be caught breaching ELS/HLS
options and may  therefore continue existing practices (e.g.,
supplementary feeding, applying fertilizer) where the options
actually forbid this.” (Respondent id: QKUYGC)
At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, a  number of
advisors commented that punitive sanctions actually dissuaded
individuals from entering schemes as well as affecting the content
of agreements:
“The issue of the current punitive level of sanctions has put
off some farmers from going into schemes and has certainly
reduced an agreements ‘ambition’.” (Respondent id: E9DAB2)
Indeed, some respondents suggested that famers regarded sanc-
tions and penalties as the thin-end-of-the-wedge:
“Penalties imposed as a result of inspection are often seen as
pedantic and penny pinching for what appears to be minor
infringements.” (Respondent id: 6EATTB)
Others went further, proposing that sanctions and penalties
were inappropriate, poorly formulated and incorrectly realised:
“The main problems with the sanctions and penalties are that
they come across as being draconian and in  many cases incor-
rect and based on incorrect information either supplied by the
inspector or interpreted by the administration staff.” (Respon-
dent id: 97H33F)
and furthermore,
“Rules about penalties are over-complicated and poorly
explained. No allowance for intent − issues with extenuating or
mitigating circumstances are punished as severely as deliberate
non-compliance.” (Respondent id: 36E4W9)
Reflecting this view, only 19.9% of respondents agreed that their
clients regarded such sanctions as reasonable. Clearly, in the view of
advisors, farmers regard the potential sanctions imposed by Nat-
ural England as disproportionate, with some suggesting that the
fault lies, in part, in  the ‘uncertainty’ and ‘inconsistency’ with which
Natural England tackle these issues.
Perhaps one avenue to help address these compliance issues
would be to adopt performance-based payment schemes: here pay-
ments are directly linked to the maximization of environmental
benefits (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). Examples of agricultural
results-based payment programmes throughout Europe indicate
that they can be successful in  generating beneficial ecological,
economic and social outcomes (Burton and Schwarz, 2013), and
research in  England also suggests that payment by results is posi-
tively perceived by farmers (Schroeder et al., 2013).
4.5. Moving forwards
A new round of CAP reforms (2014–2020) has been introduced
to provide a  more streamlined, targeted and greener approach
to agricultural production and the rural environment (European
Commission, 2014). The degree of inter-pillar transfer from Pil-
lar 1 to  Pillar 2 in  England, as a  consequence, is  set to  increase
from 9% to 15% over the next six years; and Defra has commit-
ted to allocate 87% of rural development funds to  the environment
(Defra, 2014; Natural England, 2014). These revisions will see Envi-
ronmental Stewardship programmes eventually phased out and
replaced by the New Environmental Land Management Scheme or
NELMS for short (Natural England 2013). Although NELMS will be
implemented in  early 2016, current Environmental Stewardship
agreement holders will still be delivering management under the
‘older’ system. The opportunity therefore exists for further sugges-
tions for refinements to  feed into the design and operationalization
of NELMS based on lessons learned under the Environmental Stew-
ardship programme.
Respondents were allowed to  put forward four recommen-
dations that could enhance Environmental Stewardship uptake
and implementation (Table 7). Many recommendations were sug-
gested and thematic analysis identified several broad themes, the
most common of which centred on: reorganising Environmental
Stewardship delivery (22.5%); simplifying scheme processes and
procedures (19.5%); providing more information regarding envi-
ronmental option management and implementation (14.3%), and
improving the targeting of schemes (9.6%). Indeed, the views of
respondents also echo those of Lastra-Bravo et al. (2015) who  high-
light the importance of ‘institutional design’ and ‘stable policy’
for aiding farmer engagement with, and adoption of, future agri-
environmental schemes.
Overall, recommendations provided by respondents connected
with the themes central to the NEMLS programme (e.g., ‘delivering
outcomes at a landscape scale’; ‘a participative and collaborative
approach’; ‘outcome focused performance assessment’; ‘flexi-
ble and adaptable’; ‘locally tailored advice and training’; and
‘simplification’—see NELMS Project, 2013), as well as reflecting
research focusing on the design principles of future agri-
environment schemes (FERA, 2013b).  Respondent suggestions also
aligned with those expressed in recent Defra consultations on CAP
reform (Defra, 2014), which included the need to  address ‘the risk
of complexity’ and the importance of ‘targeting as a means to  direct
option choice’.
5. Conclusions
Our survey has provided an important exploratory assessment
of the English experience of Environmental Stewardship viewed
through the lens of independent farm advisors: the views of whom
are  under-represented in  the existing literature. In this regard, we
have both strengthened and expanded upon the current literature
concerning AES, and Environmental Stewardship in  particular, by
highlighting a  broad range of farm advisor views that have not
previously been, in this format at least, addressed or assessed.
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Table  7
Recommendations (R) for improvements in Environmental Stewardship delivery and implementation.
Emergent themes R1(%, n =  168) R2(%, n =  92) R3(%, n = 56) R4(%, n = 27) Overall popularity (%)
Reorganization of Environmental Stewardship delivery (e.g. alternative ways to
improve on-the-farm provision)
25.6 16.3 28.6 11.1 22.5
Simplification of Environmental Stewardship processes (e.g. streamline HLS
application requirements)
26.2 17.4 7.1 11.1 19.5
Environmental Stewardship scheme options (e.g. degree of flexibility in option
implementation)
10.1 21.7 17.9 7.4 14.3
Targeting Environmental Stewardship (e.g. tailoring to  meet local environmental
needs)
8.3 13.0 8.9 7.4 9.6
Natural England and Natural England Advisors (e.g. knowledge; interaction with
farmers)
8.9 9.8 3.6 11.1 8.5
Environmental Stewardship payments (e.g. reassess payments to reflect
environmental option requirements and changing labour and input costs)
9.5 6.5 3.6 0.0 7.0
Other  5.4 4.4 7.1 18.5 6.4
Consultation, dialogue and support (e.g. contact with industry; ES support provision
for farmers)
4.2 2.2 5.4 11.1 4.4
Agent/advisor training (e.g. ensuring agents are suitability qualified and
knowledgeable)
0.6 2.2 1.8 14.8 2.3
Mapping (e.g. improve online mapping tools) 0.6 3.3 1.8 3.7 1.8
Farmer focused (e.g. consideration of farmer viewpoints and operational constraints) 0.0 0.0  8.9 3.7 1.8
Environmental Stewardship scheme reinvention (e.g. establishing and dissolving
schemes too frequently)
0.6 0.0  3.6 0.0 0.9
Farmer knowledge (e.g. improving knowledge of ES  scheme management) 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.6
Scheme complementarity (e.g. reduce conflicts between different but
co-implemented/managed environmental schemes)
0.0 1.1 1.8 0.0 0.6
Our findings indicate that farm advisors exhibit a wide range
of expertise and experience, and that in  some cases regionality,
expertise and gender can play a  part in  influencing farm advi-
sor  perspectives and experience of Environmental Stewardship
schemes. We  have also shed some light on the facilitating role farm
advisor advice plays in  the preparation of Environmental Steward-
ship agreements, and shown that farm advisors regard what we
term the ‘knowledge-exchange encounter’ as a  crucial aspect of
this facilitative function.
Initial findings suggest that farm advisors face a  difficult bal-
ancing act: preparing agreements based around the needs of their
clients on the one hand, whilst on the other, ensuring submitted
agreements are not at odds with Natural England requirements. In
the view of most respondents, there is  an inherent tension between
farmer and Natural England objectives. This would seem to  connect
to the finding that, in the eyes of respondents, although farmers
display a broad range of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for
engaging in Environmental Stewardship agreements, they are  pri-
marily motivated by  financially-oriented reasons. And, in addition,
they demonstrate a  proclivity to make decisions about the environ-
mental management content of agreements based on how closely
this aligns with current on-farm practices and the farm business
more generally.
Equally, given that famers respect, and are open to, the advice
they externally contract, farm advisors may  have a  decisive role in
guiding farmer decision-making processes. Advisors, in this sense,
potentially occupy an influential ‘soft power’ position. This has the
prospect of going in  one of two directions, either: advisors can
encourage farmers to undertake environmentally ambitious agree-
ments that build on intrinsic ‘green’ motivations or, taking the
opposite stance, draw on farmers’ extrinsic motivations and pro-
duce agreements requiring minimal changes to on-farm practices
primarily benefiting existing farm business arrangements.
Allied to these discussions are the observations that many
respondents noted, namely, with particular reference to the HLS
tier of Environmental Stewardship, that their clients found HLS
application processes too burdensome and overly complex, a view
they also concurred with, pointing to  the need to  simplify and
streamline the system. Respondents suggested that the complex-
ity of programme arrangements and processes may  function as
a barrier for farmers and land managers: potentially acting as
a contributing factor to  decrease the environmental ambition of
agreements and increase the likelihood that the management
practices incorporated into agreements mirror those of  the ‘farm
system’. Perhaps it is the very labour intensive nature of produc-
ing an HLS agreement that provides one explanatory factor for the
observation that respondents felt they ought (and were entitled)
to be involved in  the HLS revision process, a  process in  which they
have no legitimate authority to intervene.
Overall, the narrative we have presented suggests that the
knowledge-exchange encounter is not a  simple straightforward
interaction. Rather, advisers’ opinions and comments suggest that
there are often important tensions between the goals and agendas
of the principal agents involved in preparing, implementing and
delivering Environmental Stewardship.
In  addition, our  survey has also highlighted a feeling among
advisors that, for farmers, scheme payments present a  real issue,
particularly because management interventions can have a con-
siderable impact on overall farm income and; furthermore, may
not adequately account for all the costs farmers incur and appro-
priately reflect regional socio-economic differences. Farm advisors
also indicated, and to  some extent this may  be linked to the issues
of scheme complexity we have previously discussed, that there
are challenges associated with matters of scheme compliance and
sanctions. Among respondents there was  a  general feeling that  a
significant minority of their clients were not  fully aware of scheme-
related penalties and sanctions, and in  some cases adopted a  fairly
relaxed stance towards non-compliance. Such matters pose real
issues for how enforcement works and the environmental man-
agement effectiveness of schemes, but also, raise important issues
regarding proper informed consent (i.e., that agreement holders
should be fully informed about, and understand, their contractual
obligations at the outset of the process).
Looking ahead, to ensure the success of future AES programmes,
teasing out the issues we have started to  shed light on in  this
paper will be necessary, in  particular: focusing in  more depth
on the relationships and tensions existing between farmers, farm
advisors and Natural England. This would seem to  be the most fer-
tile ground for uncovering those factors determining the overall
content, implementation and performance of AES agreements. Ulti-
mately, if  NELMS are to fruitfully replace and build on the successes
of Environmental Stewardship, as well as avoid any of  their pitfalls,
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then the issues raised by farm advisors in  this survey will be impor-
tant food for thought in developing effective schemes that work
in practice. Specifically, by acknowledging the importance of the
different agendas and dialogues occurring between farmers, pri-
vate advisors and Natural England; ensuring that participation and
environmental ambition pays and contracts are  properly enforced;
and that the operation and implementation of schemes is simple,
straightforward, easy to put into practice, accommodates farm pro-
duction and does not alienate potential participants.
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